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I. Introduction
In Germany, Switzerland usually is said to be the 'Mus terlandle
der Demokratie', a pet form, that means model of democracy. c;i­
mi!arly it might be said that the Federal Republic is the '\fuster­
landl e', the model country, for co-determination and participation 
of employees in private enterprises and public administration. 
1. RESTRICTION OF SUBJECT 
In the following, I intend to restrict myself only to economic en­
terprises which are operating in the form of a company with legal 
personality. This restriction seems to be expedient, as a reader of 
this periodical will hardly be interested in Gennan public adminis­
tration. 
The restriction to companies is expedient, as in the Republic of 
Malta, participation has been introduced in enterprises with corpo­
rative and company structure only. 1 Besides this aspect, Maltese 
firms are cooperating with German companies. So the working struc­
tures of enterprises in Germany, especially companies, may be of 
interest. 
Following these lines, we are going to deal with workers' parti­
cipation in German companies. This means that the specialities of 
companies, concerned with workers' participation on Board levels 
are being considered. This starting point does not exclude a short 
consideration of workers' participation on plant level by works 
councils, as works councils are being constituted not only in en­
terprises run by a single natural person or a partnership but also in 
companies. 
2. MEANING OF 'PARTICIPATION' 
Participation in my statements in a broad sense means that the
entrepreneur is by law not authorised to make an entrepreneurial 
1See Gerar d  Kester, Workers' Partit:ipaiion in Malta - Issues and Opi­
nions, Rotterdam 1974, an d the book review, written on K ester's publica­
tion by Josef Mica llef, in Development and Change, published by the In­
stitute of Social Studies, The Hague, Vol.6, number 3, July 1975. 
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decision without cooperating _with workers' representatives. This 
cooperation may include co-determination, which mean.s that the in­
tended decision can only be made together with workers' represen­
tatives. 
Further participation may materialise according to our law in a 
discussion of the object with workers' representatives before the 
decision has been made, or the entrepreneur may be obliged on ly
to hear the views of workers' representatives. Finally the law may 
prescribe that the entrepreneur has to give notice of his decision 
being made. So participation means cooperation in different 
grades. 2 
Before I start to give you more detailed viewpoints, let me men­
tion some aspects of the laws which are involved in the subject. 
II. Main Gennan Laws Involved
As regards economic enterprises in practice, the most important
legal structures of company law in the Federal Republic of Ger­
many are the Aktiengesellschaft (AG), that is a public stock com­
pany, and the Gesellschaft mit beschrankcer Haftung (GmbH), which 
is a private company limited by shares. So I will restrict myself to 
these two types of companies. 
The Acts concerned are the Aktiengesetz 1965 and the G esetz
betr. die GmbH of 1892. 
Relating to company boards in view of participation, the Coal
and Iron Industries Co-determination Act of 1951 and the Coal and
fron Industries Co-determination Amendment Act of 1956 must be 
mentioned, as special laws, which deal with iron and coal produc­
ing companies, established by the occupational powers, especially 
Great Britain, after World War II. 
General law, however, is contained in the Betriebsverfassungs­
gesetz 1972 (BetrVG 1972), which we shall call Works Councils
Act 1972, and which is the successor of the Works Councils Acts 
1952 and 1920. The Act of 1972 does not only regulate the compe­
tence of works councils at plant level, but also generally the par­
ticipation of workers' representatives at company boards. 
The mentioned Acts concerning participation reflect steps of a 
historical development which has not yet been concluded. German 
Trade Unions are urging further development of co-determination. 
And it must be seen as one step forward in that direction, that the 
2For further view-points see J. Micallef, The Ernopean company - A 
Comparative Study with English and Maltese Company Law, Rotterdam, 
University Press, 1975, Chapter V, p. 1 ss. 
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German Parliament is discussing a new Co-determination Bill at 
the moment. 
III. Basic Structures of Gennan Companies
1. AK.TIENGES ELLSCHAFT (AG): PUBLIC STOCK COMPANY
The structure of the German AG is especially marked by the dual
board system. Beside an exec utive board, managing the company, 
the setting-up of a supervisory board is obligatory, which is to su­
pervise the management of the executive board and to take part in 
fixing the broader lines of company policies. The General Assemb­
ly elects the supervisory board which in its rum appoints the exe­
cutive board. 
The supervisory board in a AG was created in the middle of the 
19th century. Until then, the foundation of an AG as well as its 
management were under the control of the state. Under the in­
fluence of the liberal ideas of freedom, and the further fact that the 
state authorities felt their control over AG to be rather inefficient, 
it was abolished. (Being of the opinion that) a shareholders' as­
sembly would be inefficient also to control the management of an 
AG, the State authorities created a supervisory board, elected by 
the shareholders. 
2. GESELLSCHAFT MIT BESCHRANKTER HAFTUNG (GMBH): PRIVATE
COMPANY LIMITED BY S HARES
As regards the GmbH the GmbH Act itself does not follow the
dual board system. But in this respect the mentioned Acts concern­
ing participation are of importance. 
3. INFLUENCE OF WORKS COUNCILS ACT AND Co-DETERMINATION Acrs
The Works Councils Act 1972 peremptorily demands the setting­
up of a supervisory board for all GmbH with more than 500 em­
ployees; and the Coal and Iron Industries Co-determination Act of 
1951 and the Amendment Act of 1956 prescribe the setting-up of a 
supervisory board for any GmbH coming under these Acts. 
The mentioned Acts also define as obligatory the composition of 
the supervisory boards for the AG and the GmbH and restrict the 
traditional freedom of decision of the shareholders' assembly. 
The Coal and Iron Industries Co-determination Act 1951 as well 
as the Amendment Act of 19 56 further prescribe the obligatory com­
position of the executive or managerial board of the AG and the 
GmbH, coming under these Acts. 
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N. Composition of Supervisory Councils
1. WORKS COUNCILS ACT
In companies coming under the Woms Councils Act, the Super­
visory Board consists of at  least three members. If the articles of 
association provide for more members, their number must always be 
divisible by three. This regulation is necessary as the supervisory 
boards of AG and GmbH coming under the Works Councils Act must 
consist, in one third, of representatives of the employees who hold 
the same rights and duties as the members of the supervisory board 
representing the shareholders. 
These workers' members are not elected by the shareholders' 
assemblies of the companies, as is the case with the shareholders' 
representatives in the supervisory boards, but they are elected by 
the employees of the plants of the enterprise. 
2. CO-DETERMINATION ACT 1951
In the companies of the iron and coal producing industries com­
ing under the Co-determination Act 19 51, the supervisory boards 
are to consist of 11, 15 or 21 members. The supervisory board con­
sisting of 11 members is to be made up of 
(a) 4 representatives of the shareholders and one so-called fur-
ther member, 
(b) 4 representatives of the employees and one further member,
(c) one further member.
The further members must be independent personalities, that is 
they must neither have common interests with the shareholders nor 
with the employees. The Co-determination Act contains more de­
tailed regulations as to this. 
The election of the representatives of the shareholders does not 
raise any special questions. 
The election of the representatives of the employees, on the 
other hand, is a rather complicated procedure. 
Out of the 5 representatives of the employees of the supervi­
sory board of 11 members, one worker and one white-collar worker 
of the enterprise are elected by the works councils of the plants of 
the enterprise by secret ballot, after consultation with the head or­
ganisations of the trade unions. They are nominated to the share­
holders' assembly for election as the representatives of the em­
ployees. Two members are nominated by the head organisations of 
the trade unions after consultation with the trade unions represent­
ed in the enterprise concerned and the works' councils of the en­
terprise. The same applies to the further member who is to be no-
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minated for the representatives of the employees. 
The 11th member, a so-called further member, is to be nominated 
to the shareholders' assembly by the 10 members of the supervi­
sory board representing the shareholders and the employees. 
A very complicated procedure is provided for, in case the share­
holders' assembly does not elect the nominated persons, a case 
which fortunately so far has not happened yet in practice. 
3. AMENDMENT ACT 1956 
Referring to the Coal and Iron Industries Amendment Act 1956,
I only want to state that after the Occupational Powers of World 
War II had given up their de-ca.rte Uisation policy in Germany and 
permitted, again the setting-up of concerns for German firms, the· 
Co-determination Amendment Act 1956 was passed in order to se­
cure the co-determination of employees in the supervisory boards 
of the concerns. I do not want to consider this further because of 
and executive boards of the concerns. I do not want to consider 
thi s further because of lack of space. 
V. Composition of Executive Boards
Apart from the composition of a Supervisory Board in parity of
shareholders and employees, one further decisive characteristic of 
co-determination in coal or iron producing enterprises coming under 
the Coal and Iron Industries Co-determination Act or the Amend­
ment Act is the obligatory legal regulation that a director for la­
bour relations must be appointed to the executive board as a mem­
ber of equal rights and duties. The labour relations director cannot 
be appointed to the executive board against the votes of the majo­
rity of the employees' representatives in the supervisory board. 
VI. Tasks of the supervisory Board and the Executive Board
Let us now shortly deal with the tasks of the executive boards.
The executive board of an AG has to manage the company in its 
own responsibility (§ 76 AktG); this means that they are neither 
bound by law to orders of the supervisory board nor to those of the 
general assembly. There does not ex-ist a corresponding regulation 
for the management of the GmbH. The managers of the GmbH may be 
bound by conclusions of the shareholders (§ 37 GmbHG). 
The supervisory board mainly has to supervise the management 
(§ 11 AktG). It holds the unlimited right of information, and the
executive board is obliged to inform it on all essential occurrenc­
es in the company, especially so on the company's policy (§ 90 
AktG). This enables the supervisory board to influence the mana-
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gement's policy by recommendations, hints and suggestions. It is
not bound to orders from the shareholders' assembly. 
VII. Participation of Employees according to the Works C01D1cils
Act 1972
After having pointed out some basic ideas of participation and 
co-determination at company boards, I want to give you some short 
information on works councils, in order to complete the picture. 
According to the works councils law, in plants with more than 5 
regular employees works councils have to be formed which may 
consist of one to 35 persons according to the number of employees. 
These councils deal with various matters. 
The works council has an actual and real right of co-determina­
tion as to social affairs (§ 87) and as regards changes in th e plant 
which will be disadvantageous to the employees (§§ 111 ss.) . 
They also have a right for co-operation in personal affairs(§§ 92 
ss.). 
Further, in plants with more than 100 regular employees an eco­
nomy-committee is to be formed which has a right of information by 
the employer(§§ 106 ss.). 
All workers of a plant constitute the plants' assembly(§§ 43 ss. ). 
1. SOCIAL AFFAIRS
As I mentioned, the works council has to co-decide in social
questions, i.e. the employer cannot decide alone on these affairs; 
he must discuss them with the works council and must come to an 
agreement with them. The affairs which come under the co-determi­
nation of the works council are exactly stated in the law: 
(a) questions of order in the works and the conduct of employees
therein; 
(b) beginning and ending of daily working time and recesses as
well as the allocation of the working hours to the week days (in­
cluding Saturdays); 
(c) temporary shortening or extension of the usual working hours
at the works; 
(d) time, place and manner of payment of wages and salaries;
(e) establishment of general principles governing vacations and
the scheduling thereof as well as fixing periods of vacation for in­
dividual employees, if no agreement can be reached between the 
employer and the employees concerned; 
(f) introduction and application of technical apparatus serving to 
check the conduct or the efficiency of employees; 
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(g) regulations concerning the prevention of industrial accidents
and occupational illnesses, and the protection of health within the 
scope of the legal provisions or the safety regulations; 
(h) form, arrangement and administration of socia l  weliare ser­
vices that are limited to the operations of the works, the enter prise 
or the concern; 
(i) allocation and termination of housing which is rented to the
employees on the basis of the employment relationship as well as 
the general fixing of conditioos for use; 
(j) questions pertaining to the wage framework, especially the
setting-up of principles of remuneration and the institution aod ap­
plication of new methods of remuneration as well as their altera­
tion; 
(k) fixing of piece-work pay and premiums and comparable perfor­
mance-based remuneration including the financial factor; 
(l) principles concerning the suggestions procedure.
The settling of questions between the e;i1ployer and the works
cowicil will be carried out in each case by a plant-bargaining. 
These single plant-bargainings are .rendered the same effects as 
the collective agreements of Trade Unions, i.e. these agreements 
are directly effective and obligatory for all employees(§ 77 sub­
sec. ( 4)). 
2. PERSONNEL MATTERS
In questions of personal affairs the works council takes part in
recruiting man power, change of working groups, change of working 
place and dismissals (§§ 99 ss.). 
When, for instance, a new employee is taken on, the employer 
has to inform the works council of the new employment. The works 
council can raise objections against it. If no agreement can be 
reached the employer is entitled to engage the applicant provi­
sionally and has to apply then to the Court of Labour for the re­
placement of the lacking consent of the works council by a deci­
sion of the coun, which will examine whether the council had a 
justified reason for their refusal of approval. The same applies to 
changes of working groups and changes of working places. 
Furthermore, the employer is obliged to bear the works cowicil 
before dismissing an employee. 
3. PLANT ASSEMBLY 
The plants' assembly will come together at least every quarter
of a year. There wiU be given reports on current affairs by the 
works council and the employer only and que�tions will be discus-
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sed, but no decisions are taken. 
4. ECONOMIC CO.'\tMITTEE
The Committee of Economics, which, though not identical with
the Works Council, must however, count at least one member of the 
works council among its members, and is intended to secure mutual 
information between the works council and the employer on econo­
mic affairs (§§ 106 ss.). This Committee is entitled to information 
on the economic affairs of the enterprise. The economic affairs in­
clude amongst others: 
(a) the economic and financial situation of the enterprise;
(b) the production and sales situation; 
(c) the production and investments program;
(d) manpower-saving plans;
(e) methods of work and production, particularly the instituting
of new methods of w ark; 
(f) cutbacks .or closing down of works or of pans of works;
(g) the geographical transfer of works or parts of wades;
(h) the amalgamation of works;
(i) any ehange in the organisation or the purpose of the works;
(j) other matters and ventures which could vitally concern the
interests of the employees of the works. 
VIII. Purpose and Basic Ideas of Participation
Until now, I have bombarded you with many complicated techni­
cal details, though I have only roughly described the contours. The 
field of participation is so very complicated because of the mani­
fold conflicts of interests behind it, regarding economics, social 
and general politics. In order to help you understand the specific 
German problem of participation in spite of the complicated regu­
lations, I will shortly deal, by way of keywords, so to say, with 
the connections to economic, social and general politics. Thus the 
deep-going differences to the regulations in other European count� 
ries will become more comprehensible. 
1. SOME SENTENCES OF A FA,'10US BRITISH AUTHOR
In 1776 a famous British writer published the following sentenc­
es: 
(i) Labour .•• is the real measure of the exchangeable value of
all commodities. 
(ii) Labour was the first price, the original purchase money that
was paid for all things. 
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(iii) The produce of labour constitutes the natural recompense or
wages of labour. 
(iv) In that early and rude state of society which preceeds both
the accumulation of stock and the appropriation of land, the propor­
tion between the quantities of labour necessary for acquiring dif­
ferent objects seems to be the only circumstance which can afford 
any rule for exchanging them for one another. 
(v) As soon as the land of any country has all become private
property, the landlords, like all other men, love to reap where they 
never sowed and demand a rent even for its natural produce. 
(vi) As soon as stock accumulated in the hands of particular
persons, some of them will naturally employ it in setting to work 
industrious people, whom they will supply with materials and sub­
sistence, in order to make. a profit by the sale of their work or by 
what their labour adds to the value of the materials. 
The author of these sentences was none other than Adam Smith, 
formerly Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glas­
gow, later the High Tax Commissioner in Scotland, in his famous 
book • An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Na­
tions'. 3 
The reference has been made because I could imagine that you 
will realise the connection between those sentences and the back­
ground of the German approach to Participation, especially co-de­
termination. 
2. BACKGROUND IN GERMAN LEGAL HISTORY
Seen from the point of view of legal history, the present Co-de­
termination Acts dealing with participation find their predecessors 
in the Weimar Constitution and in the Works Councils Act of 1920 
and some related laws. 
Art. 165 of the Weimar Constitution provided for a programme of 
socialisation of industries suited for it, which were to be managed 
by a councils system e.g. works councils, regional labour and eco­
nomic councils and a Reichs Labour Council and a Reichs Econo­
mic Council. Actually, only the works councils were established 
out of the number of councils of this system, these being organs of 
public law in view of the aim of socialisation. The Works Councils 
Act of 1920 also provided for representation of employees in the 
supervisory boards by a third of the members. 
3 See the first edition of which I referred to, especially top. 35, 36, 78; 
58, 56, 59, 57. 
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3. DEVELOPMENT AFTER WORLD WAR II
The efforts of reviving the programme of Art. 165 of the Weimar
Constitution which then had not been realised, after World War II, 
especially that of achieving the socialisation of the key industries, 
failed above all because of the opposition of the USA as Occupa­
tional Power. Within the framework of the de-carte llisacion of the 
coal-, iron- and steel-producing industries, the development went 
on to co-determination in parity instead. This came about under the 
Iron and Coal Co-determination Acts and the introduction of works 
councils - by the Works Councils Act 1952 - as it was already 
known from the Works Councils Act of 19�. The German trade un­
ions, by accepting the step towards co-determination in parity, 
gave up their claim for socialisation and recognised the capitalist 
economic system, with the consequence that the works councils 
were not anymore the employees' representations under public law 
but organs of the employees under private law. 
4. ECONOMIC-, SOCIAL- AND LEGAL-POLITICAL BACKGROUNDS OF THE
DEMAND FOR CO-DETERMINATION IN PARITY OF THE EMPLOYE ES4
(a) In order to give more light to the background of the demand 
for co-determination in parity of the employees we may generally 
go back to the basic idea of Art. 165 of the Weimar Constitution. 
According to the official reasons for that Article, it was under­
stood to mean that the worker was not to be only worker but pro­
ducer as well. Its aim was 'to pave the way for the wocking mass­
es to ascend to free human existence with moral dignity and res­
ponsibility'. 
(b) Behind this basic idea and purpose we fin d  the social fact,
that the employee's relation to his employer is one of domination, 
that he is personally and usually also economically dependent on 
the employer. Participation is to give him more eq uality and free­
dom. 
(c) The demand for co-determination, further, is based on the
change of structure m the big industrial enterprises, which mark 
4See as to these aspects for further information Fritz Fabricius, Mitbes·
timmung in der Wirtschaft - Ein gesellscha/ts•, wirtscha/ts· und recht­
spolitisches Problem, Atheniium Verlag, Frankfurt am. Main, 1970; Fritz 
Fabricius, 'Co-determination in European Company Law,' in: The Hamzo­
nisation of European Company Law, edited by Clive M. Schmitthoff, Unit­
ed Kingdom Comparative Law Series, distributed by The British Institute 
of International and Comparative Law, London, p.101-129; further Fritz 
Fabricius, 'A Theory of Co-determination', ibid, p.138-156. 
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the picture of economy in our time. As John Kenneth Galbraith 
states in his book 'The Industrial St ate', it is marked by the fact 
that the management of the enterprise has become independent from 
the entrepreneur, who only appears as the giver of capital. And he 
also holds that the management's functions are influenced strong­
ly by the so-called technostructure. 
(d) Finally, the growing interdependence of industry a nd state
is to be taken into account. 
(e) From these facts, above all, the sociologist Hondrich con­
cludes in his book 'Mitbestimmung in Europa', (1970), that the 
struggle for co-determination is being fought because the position 
of power of the entrepreneur has been shifted towards the employ­
ees in the course of the past 50 years, which shift was combined 
with the growth of political power of the employees. So, co-deter­
mination was to turn this actual growth of power into legalised au­
thority. 
(f) From the point of view of legal politics co-determination may 
be seen as a means to assist the working masses 'in attaining a 
human status, enjoying moral dignity and responsibility', terms 
which are based upon the concepts of human fre edom and equality. 
The demand for co-determination derived from a demand for more 
equality and equal legal rights. It is thus made on the basis of 
equal rights for labour and capital. So it may be understood as the 
demand for a further development of the formally liberal democratic 
legal state towards a materially liberal democratic legal state. 
This, above all, means a far-reaching realisation of the principle 
of equality. 
(g) From a theoretical point of view it may be asked whether
co-determination in parity can be introduced without answering the 
issue of ownership in industrial property. 
Such co-determination would involve the representatives of the 
employees jn decision-making with regard to the disposition of 
goods which they do not own, such as the property of the entrepre­
neur. In my personal view, it is necessary to make them co-owners 
of the production, not the means of production, based on the basic 
principle that labour aims at property. Besides, a certain amount 
of the share of the production-property must obligatorily be invest· 
ed in shares of the company. Ackn ow !edging these principles, so­
cialisation or nationalisation of industrial property will be avoid­
ed, the free market economy will remain untouched and workers 
will become shareholders in the capitalist system. 
As to further information I may refer to my publications, men­
tioned in footnote 4. 
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IX. Practical Experience
As regards practical experiences with co-determination in the
Federal Republic so far, I would like to state that the results of 
respective investigations on the whole have shown positive re­
sults. There will only be mentioned here the Report of the Expert 
Commission of the Federal Government. 
X. Aspects of Future Development
1. A NEW STATUTE IN TIIE MAKING
In its communique at the beginning of their legislative period on
the 12th January 1972, the present German Government announced 
its intention to draft a new statute on co-determination of employ­
ees in enterprises developed from the principle of legal equality 
and equal weight of employees and shareholders. On the 22nd of 
February 1974, a draft called 'Encwurf eines Gesetzes uber die 
Mitbestimmung der Arbeitoehmer (Mitbestimmungsgesetz - Mit­
bestG)' was submitted by the Federal Government to the Bundes­
rat. The draft proposed to introduce an equally balanced co-deter­
mination of employees into all AG and GmbH with 2000 employees. 
The complicated rules of the draft, put together in 34 sections, can­
not be dealt with here. There are heated discussions about it at 
the moment, since a compromise, which would be endorsed by all 
political groups, does not seem to have been found. 
2. AN EVOLUTION FROM THE CONCEPT OF COMPANY LA� TO A LAW OF
ENTERPRISE
Under the influence of the Co-determination Acts, traditional
company law is developing new structures. In view of the fact that 
co-determination in the enterprises in the Federal Republic will be 
extended during the next years, the Federal Republic is on the way 
to a new law of enterprise, which will earlier or later absorb tradi­
tional company law. 
But the main point, you may keep in mind, is that co-determina­
tion is an approach to materialise the basic democratic principles 
of freedom and equality. 
I am therefore not inclined to translate the German word 'pari­
ditische Mitbestimmung' into English by 'Co-deterioration on the 
basis of equal representa_tion on the board of companies', as was 
done in a book review in the 'Guardian' of 18th December 1974 on 
the recently published new edition of Langenscheidt's Encyclo­
paedic Dictionary of the English and German Languages. 
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